We consider the problems of access control and encrypted keyword search for cryptographic cloud storage in such a way that they can be implemented for a multiple users setting. Our fine-grained access control aware multi-user secure keyword search approach interdependently harmonizes these two security notions, access control and encrypted keyword search. Owing to the shrinkage of the cloud server's search space to the user's decryptable subset, the proposed scheme both decreases information leakage and is shown to be efficient by the results of our contrastive performance simulation.
Introduction
To address users' concerns about confidentiality and privacy when using the cloud storage service, one common approach is adopting cryptographic techniques. Kamara et al. [11] proposed an architecture that combines several latest cryptographic primitives with the cloud storage, called cryptographic cloud storage. Even if this model will ease user's concerns about data leakage, it also introduces some new problems: because the encryption of data is not meaningful to the cloud servers, many useful data processing operations performed by cloud servers become infeasible.
In this paper, we consider a multi-user cryptographic cloud storage model to conveniently satisfy users' requirements of data confidentiality and privacy. A general use case of the electrical medical record (EMR) [1] based on this model is described as follows: a patient, Alice, wants to subscribe her EMR to the medical data center. The service allows Alice to share her health information and medical record with doctors from different hospitals and staffs from pharmacies or insurance companies. In order to protect her privacy, Alice wants to encrypt all her information, ensuring that even the employees of the data center or other unreManuscript received June 11, 2013 . Manuscript revised February 17, 2014 . † The authors are with Kyushu University, Fukuoka-shi, 819-0395 Japan.
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a) E-mail: zhao@itslab.csce.kyushu-u.ac. Only authorized doctors are allowed to search and read her prior encrypted EMR and some of them are also authorized to update some items. These authorized doctors (perhaps belonging to different hospitals/departments) need to update related records in real time so that the latest EMR can be shared with all relevant persons. The read/update privilege management mechanism of the EMR must be independent of the data owner, Alice, once she creates the EMR access permission rule, because it is impossible to require a patient to be always available online to manage each data access of her EMR.
Challenging Issues
Even if many security protocols for cloud storage have been proposed, we find that some significant characteristics are still unsatisfied in the multi-user cloud storage environment. Below, we summarize several challenging issues.
• Several existing works adopt traditional or the latest cryptographic primitives for providing secure access control to the cloud storage. However, because it is difficult for a cloud server to differentiate writers and readers of each encrypted file, most schemes only consider a simple use case that the data owner creates the encrypted file for sharing with multi-users who are allowed to read but not to update the file, and only the owner is allowed to update the file. We call it 1-writemany-read. Providing both write and read access permissions to multiple users can realize a more flexible access mechanism for cryptographic cloud storage. For example, after the data owner creates an encrypted file on the cloud, users who hold update access rights are allowed to update that file at a later time without help from the owner. We call such a mechanism the ownerindependent many-write-many-read (OI-MWMR). To the best of our knowledge, no existing fine-grained access control protocols achieve the OI-MWMR.
• Most of the existing encrypted keyword search schemes ignore the access right of the user while performing the search algorithm because in general, it is difficult for the cloud server to distinguish the relationship between a user and numerous encrypted files only through an encrypted keyword (or called a trapdoor) he/she generated. Such an issue further brings two problems:
Copyright c 2014 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers -Usually, not all users are allowed to read (decrypt) all the files on the cloud server. If each user is allowed to search keywords through all the files and obtains the result that includes those undecryptable ones, privacy information leakage may happen: the result tells whether a keyword is (or, not) related to any files, even if both the keyword and the file are encrypted. -Since a search algorithm is processed by the cloud server, the performance of cloud server is an essential issue. The performance can be improved much more if the cloud server only searches each keyword from a subset (e.g. decryptable files) but not from the whole storage.
• If we want to apply some traditional encrypted keyword search schemes (e.g. [7] , [8] ) to the multi-user cryptographic cloud storage setting, a naive approach is sharing the secret (search) key. However, sharing keys is generally not a good idea because it increases the risk of key exposure. Since a shared secret key must be changed if any user is no longer qualified to access the data, changing keys also results in re-generating all secure indexes. For the cloud storage with numerous users and files, this approach is not practical.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we study the access control and keyword search scheme of cryptographic cloud storage. We summarized main contributions of our work.
• We propose an access structure based reader/writer differentiation mechanism. Based on this idea, the OI-MWMR is successfully achieved and implemented to both of the file body and its secure indexes.
• We present an encrypted keyword search approach that we call fine-grained access control aware encrypted keyword search: the cloud server is only allowed to search an encrypted keyword over the user's decryptable data subset using the proposed access structure computation. As an additional contribution, a binary tree based file management approach is proposed to reduce the computation overhead and optimize the search efficiency. Two advantages of our approach over most existing works are shown by our security analysis and performance simulation:
-Decreasing the information leakage from the keyword search process which is executed between users and the cloud server. -Being more efficient than existing works since the proposed method does not need to examine those unreadable files.
• Since each user uses a distinct secret key for his keyword search, the key update and the user revocation can be easily achieved without complicated processes of decryption and re-encryption of indexes.
• Several newly extended security requirements are defined for the multi-user model. The security of our scheme is successfully analyzed and proved based on them.
• Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is widely applied to the cloud for secure data sharing. However, few practical keyword search scheme is proposed for them because of the complex composition of its ciphertext. Our work gives a simple and practical solution for ABE based cloud storage.
System Models
We first introduce the entities involved in our scheme, then we identify two important functional concepts.
Entities
• Cloud Server: The main responsibility of the cloud server is to store and to process encrypted data according to authorized users' requests. The cloud server is modeled as honest-but-curious in our scheme. Cloud servers are assumed to be semi-trusted, which mean servers are honest to save user's file and to perform data operations requested from authorized parties.
• Trusted Authority (TA): TA is a fully trusted third party. Firstly, it is responsible for managing all attributes and their related cryptographic keys. Secondly, it manages user's enrollment and revocation for the proposed scheme. The setup process of keys for users and the cloud storage server is operated by TA.
• Data Owner: A data owner first creates (encrypts) data for sharing and secure indexes for keyword search, defines the access privileges policies, and then set them up to the cloud server.
• Users: There are multiple users with different access privileges which map to numerous files on the cloud server. Except for the data owner, we define two kinds of users for each file, readers and writers. Readers who have the decryption right and can read. Writers who have both decryption and encryption rights, can read/update files (including update secure indexes). Both readers and writers are able to require the cloud to perform the keyword search to retrieve encrypted files.
Functionality Goals
• Fine-grained access control with OI-MWMR: It facilitates specifying both read and write access rights to each file for a set of users in terms of their attribute set. The OI-MWMR (owner-independent manywrite-many-read) means that for each file on the cloud, there may exist multiple writers and readers respectively. Writers are allowed to update a file in a secure manner without any help (e.g. a real-time authorization) from the data owner.
• Fine-grained access control aware keyword search: Let n be the number of encrypted files on the cloud, and a user, u, wants the server to search the files that contain a keyword w. m (m ≤ n) is the file number on the cloud that can be decrypted by u. This functionality requires that the cloud executes the keyword search after narrowing the search scope from n to m by being aware of access privileges of u.
Security Requirements and Assumption

Security Requirements and Definitions
We integrate and exploit several security properties from [2] , [6] , [23] , [25] , [26] to summarize security requirements for the proposed scheme under the multi-user cloud model.
• Impersonation Resistance. Traditionally, impersonation resistance requires that an adversary cannot authenticate itself as a legitimate user to any honest entity. In our model, both readers and writers are legitimate users. If a reader successfully impersonates a writer, then he can modify the corresponding data on the cloud server which includes: encrypted data, secure indexes, and access policies. Here, this property is extended defined as no readers can impersonate writers to illegally update any data on the cloud server.
• Inaccessible Information Invisibility. Our work first defines this security property for the encrypted keyword search scheme. It requires no user is allowed to access the data which is not decryptable for him according to his access privilege. In our scheme, it requires a user cannot get information (such as Search(w) ? = φ: whether the search result for keyword w is null) from search results over his undecryptable files.
• Query Privacy. Query privacy is a common security requirement for all encrypted keyword search schemes. This security notion mainly considers the amount of information leakage (i.e. information that directly relates to plaintext of data and keywords, corresponding secret keys) to the cloud server regarding user queries. In other words, apart from the information that can be acquired via observation and the information derived from it, this notion requires no other information should be exposed. 
• Query Unforgeability. This property is only applicable to the multiple users setting: it requires a dishonest user cannot generate a legitimate query on behalf of another (valid) user. For a user u from the valid user set U (u ∈ U) and a keyword w, we define u's legitimate query set asQ
is indeed generated by u's secret key K u , and S ig(Q u ) is generated by u's signing key S K S . Query unforgeability is defined based on a game between an adversary and a challenger. Letû be the target user of the adversary A. In A's game, the challenger simulates the protocol which allows A to obtain queries on keywords of her choices with respect to userû. Specifically, A first picks her target userû and is given keys of the remaining users, say, u ∈ U\û. Then A queries the oracle Φ which returns a set {Q, Sig(Q)} at her will with the restriction that the number of queries is polynomial-bounded. Let Q û = {Q û , S ig(Q û )} denote the set ofû's queries and signatures obtained by A. A wins the game if and only if the generated (Q, Sig(Q)) ∈ Qû\Q û . The advantage of A against query unforgeability is defined as the probability of her winning the game.
Definition 2:
Query Unforgeability. An encrypted keyword search protocol achieves query unforgeability if for anyû ∈ U, and for all PPT algorithms A:
• Revocability. Revocation is an indispensable property for all multi-user schemes. TA is responsible for managing users' identities in our scheme. If a user is no longer allowed to access files on the cloud, one of the most important tasks of TA is revoking his search capability. Since the incapability of searching the indexes is implied by the incapability of distinguishing them, we define revocability based on the index indistinguishability. An adversary's advantage in attacking revocability is defined as her winning probability in the following game. The adversary A runs in following two stages:
In the first stage, A 1 acts as an authorized user and is allowed to access the oracle Φ as described in Definition 2. At the end of this stage, 
Definition 3:
Revocability. An encrypted keyword search protocol achieves revocability if for all PPT al-
Remark. This definition of revocability based on the index indistinguishability addresses the revocation of the keyword search capability. The purpose of our definition is different from the attribute revocation (e.g. [12] ) which aims to deprive users' read access privilege corresponding to those revoked attributes. If attribute revocation happens in our system, it requires the update of ciphertext and its signature, and (possibly) users' secret keys. All these should be executed together with TA, the cloud server, and data owners, etc. The discussion of attribute revocation is out of the scope of this paper. However, we argue that both (i) keyword search capability and (ii) data access privilege will be heavily influenced by the attribute revocation in our system, and this problem is considered as one of our future research.
Assumption
We assume that the user-server collusion is not included in our adversarial model. Although this assumption is quite strong, it is a practically reasonable assumption which is also utilized in [2] , [23] . In our scheme, secret keys and the plaintext of a trapdoor are still kept secure even if such an active attack (user-server collusion) is launched. However, from a technical perspective, the attack is able to comprise most search schemes in another form: the server can always compare the access patterns between a target user and the colluding user. Furthermore, illegal file-updates (coming from the malicious users) will be permitted. All communication between any two parties is also assumed secure under TLS/SSL in the network/transport layer.
Technical Preliminaries
Our scheme builds on the work by Bethencourt et al., Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [3] , and Maji et al., Attribute-based signature (ABS) [14] . Only a conceptual introduction is given here, please refer to Appendix A for a more detailed algorithm description.
CP-ABE is one of the latest public key cryptography primitives for secure data sharing. A user's private key will be associated with an arbitrary number of attributes expressed as strings. When a party encrypts a message, they first specify an associated access structure over attributes. Users will be able to decrypt a ciphertext if their attributes satisfy the ciphertext's access structure.
ABS is a versatile primitive that allows a party to sign a message with fine-grained control based on its attributes. More specifically, the signer, who possesses a set of attributes, can sign a message with a predicate that is satisfied by his attributes. It ensures that only a signer can generate a signature if her attributes satisfies the predefined predicate. E.g. in a hospital, only a doctor who satisfies the T sel f −sign ( Fig. 2) can issue an official certificate of heart diseases.
Concrete Construction
We introduce concrete construction of the proposed scheme in this section. We consider such a scene: after the data owner creates encrypted files on the cloud, other users (readers/writers) can securely read/write, and retrieve interested data using the keyword search scheme which is executed by the cloud server while considering their access right. Note that a novel and important characteristic of our scheme is that both encrypted file body and their encrypted keyword indexes support the many-write-many-read, which is a key contribution compared to other existing schemes.
Design Concept
Fine-Grained Access Control with OI-MWMR
One of the most important access control characteristics in the multi-user cryptographic cloud storage model is the ability of separating readers and writers of a file. We first propose an access structure based reader/writer differentiation mechanism which achieves the OI-MWMR. The file owner first decides two access structures T decrypt (used in CP-ABE) and T update−sign (used in ABS), see Fig. 1 . Then he sets (uploads) the T update−sign with its encrypted file to the cloud server. For other users (writers) who want to update the file on the cloud server at a later time, they must possess attribute sets described in T update−sign . Note that we do not need to differentiate writers and readers at the individual-user level but at an attribute level. The latter is much better optimized than the former whose management complexities may increase linearly upon the number of users, but the latter will not. As an example in Fig. 1 , a patient with heart disease creates his EMR access policy for sharing with others: users who satisfy attributes tree "cardiologist"∨"nurse"∨"insurance staff" are allowed to read (decrypt) his EMR; users who satisfy attributes structure "nurse"∧"insurance staff"∨"cardiologist" are not only allowed to read but are also allowed to update. Note that our scheme is different from another ABE based solution, signcryption [19] , [24] , which integrates ABE and ABS together (it only requires one single access structure). Since the decryption and verification must be ex- ecuted simultaneously, it thwarts their scheme from differentiating readers and writers.
Fine-Grained Data Access Control Aware Keyword Search
Access control needs to be enforced before the cloud server searches a keyword, and, a user is not allowed to search through data which is not decryptable for him. We construct our proposal based on the cloud infrastructure as described in Sect. 5.1.1 and a query protocol of Bao et al. [2] , [23] . We stress that it is not sufficient to use these schemes as-is to achieve functionality goals defined in Sect. 2 because it is difficult for the cloud server to distinguish the relationship between a user and numerous encrypted files only through an encrypted keyword (or called a trapdoor) he/she generated. Our approach, access structure computation (Definition 4), successfully solved this challenge issue and achieved the functionality goal.
To realize our idea, we take advantage of the access structures of CP-ABE and ABS to (i) allow the cloud server to focus on the user's decryptable file group; (ii) make a user prove to the cloud server that he really holds those attributes for decryption before his query is executed. More specifically, (i) is achieved by comparing the T decrypt of CP-ABE with the T sel f −sign of ABS which is generated by the user. (ii) is achieved by generating an ABS using the AND of all his attributes:
is the user's ID and it is considered as a special attribute).
The result of signature verification shows whether the user holds those attributes as he claims. An example is given in Fig. 2 : a doctor can prove the possession of his attributes "cardiologist" ∧ "heart disease dept." ∧ "U id " by generating an ABS with the T sel f −sign . If the verification succeeds, the cloud storage server clarifies whether the user can decrypt a file by checking: T sel f −sign | = T decrypt = 1 or 0, "| =" is formally defined:
Definition 4: Let T 1 (e.g. T sel f −sign ) and T 2 (e.g. T decrypt ) be two access trees (also called access structure) in attributebased cryptosystems. T 1 | = T 2 is an access structure computation that outputs 1 or 0, where 1 means that at least one attribute (e.g. "cardiologist") described in T 1 meets the requirement of T 2 . 0 means no such attributes exist in T 1 which can satisfy T 2 † . The proposed revocation mechanism enables the system administrator to dynamically and efficiently revoke the future's search capability of a malicious user. We consider that such a countermeasure (revoking the search capability) as a reasonable and cost-effective method against malicious users in our system. First, a revoked user, who holds decryption access privilege of some files, cannot get useful data through a wiretapping because all the communication is protected under TLS/SSL in the network/transport layer. Second, a revoked user may indeed decrypt some files with his old keys if he successfully intrudes into the cloud server. Sahai et al. [18] proposed a solution of attribute revocation which enables the "ciphertext delegation" instead of a simple "decrypt then re-encrypt" to prevent such a threat. Such protocols would solve this threat where revoked users still can access previously decryptable ciphertexts with their old keys. This issue is out of the scope of this paper and could be considered in our future work.
Proposed Scheme
The proposed scheme consists of a tuple of algorithms {Setup(), Create(), Write(), Query(), Search(), Read(), Update(), Revocation()}. Next, we give a detailed description.
Setup():
The initialization algorithm Setup() is run by TA to set the key materials for processing both the file and its query related data. a. CreateFile(): The data owner first encrypts a file for sharing with other users. The encryption is based on CP-ABE. The decryption policy in the CT is described by the access structure T decrypt .
The ciphertext CT of a file M is generated as:
The owner then generates the signature of CT . He hashes the CT and then signs it by the ABS. To prevent the replay attack, we insert a version number tag n to the ABS. The server later only accepts valid updates if the new version number tag n satisfies n = n + 1. Later, the user will confirm the latest n of the CT from the cloud server before she generates the signature SG.
The algorithm is run by the owner and the cloud server interactively. This algorithm outputs a secure index I(w i ) for a keyword w i from {w 1 , w 2 , . . .}. The data owner first uploads the {U id , h(w i ) r } to the cloud server. h(): {0, 1} * → G 0 is a collision resistant hash function and r ∈ Z p is a random number. After receiving the request, the cloud server calculates the Cap w for each w i and then sends it back to the data owner.
The data owner can build the index for each w i as I(w i ). k is the key for HMAC and R ∈ Z p is a random number.
The owner writes (or uploads) both the encrypted file (with signature) and its secure indexes to the cloud server. Note the access structure of ABS , T update−sign (which is transmitted separately with the SG), allows the cloud server to differentiate readers and writers at a later time. Finally, {CT, S G, n, I(w i ), T update−sign } are written to the cloud server. 4. Query(): For a specific keyword w i , the user first generates a trapdoor Q(w i ), then he generates an ABS, Sig(Q(w i )).
Note that the T sel f −sign is made by all of the user's attributes including the user's ID:
The signature ABS shows that the user certainly possesses a set of attributes from the authority as he/she declared in the access tree T sel f −sign . The cloud server verifies the user's attributes by public keys from TA. In this step, the user sends {U id , Q(w i ), S ig(Q(w i ))} to the cloud server. 5. Search(): After receiving the query, the server first checks the complementary key CK U id by the user ID, U id . If the U id is valid, the server confirms the user's decryptable file group by: (i) Verify attribute set of the user as described in T sel f −sign by the ABS-verification,
Veri f y(PK S , h(Q(w i )), T sel f −sign , Sig(Q(w i )))
The verification key PK S is published by TA. If the ABS verification result is true, the user's attributes as he/she declared in the T sel f −sign are confirmed.
(ii) Using T decrypt from CT , the cloud server can confirm the search scope S as the following procedure:
f or(i = 0; i < n; i + +){ //i: index number; n: total number of files.
Then the cloud server performs the the keyword search only over the scope S . It first computes k = e(Q(w i ), CK U id ), and then checks each index of the data CT in the scope S as: HMAC k (R) ? = HMAC k (R). Finally, the server sends the search result to the user. 6. Read(): Using the result of the Search() step, a valid user can get the target files and read. The Read() algorithm first verifies the S G with T update−sign and corresponding public keys PK S from TA. 
Veri f y(PK S , h(CT ) n, T update−sign , S G)
Security Analysis
We analyze the security of our proposed scheme, and in particular we show that the proposed scheme satisfies general security requirements described in Sect. 3. Impersonation Resistance. Readers and writers have different privileges. If a reader successfully impersonates a writer, then he can illegally modify the corresponding data on the cloud server which includes: encrypted data, secure indexes, and access structures. The policy to differentiate writer with readers is defined as T update−sign . Cloud server clarifies writers and readers based on the result of ABS verification. Both readers and other unauthorized users cannot impersonate writers' privileges because they cannot forge the ABS of writers. Consequently, the unforgeability of ABS ensures the impersonation resistance of our scheme.
Inaccessible Information Invisibility. Information leakage from search results needs to be considered when designing protocols for multi-user cryptographic cloud storage. In our scheme, by implementing and exploiting access structure from attribute-based cryptosystems, the cloud server only performs the keyword search on the user's accessible file subset. The result of T sel f −sign | = T decrypt shows the cloud server whether a file is decryptable to the user without exchanging any secret key beforehand. As a result, the output of Search() will not involve redundant information (e.g. Whether the cloud holds any files that contains the same keyword). Our scheme achieves the property of inaccessible information invisibility.
Query Privacy. Our protocol achieves Definition 1 in the following theorem, the proof is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 1:
The proposed encrypted keyword search scheme achieves query privacy in Definition 1 if HMAC is an unforgeable MAC, h() is a pseudorandom function, and CP-ABE is secure.
Query Unforgeability. Our protocol achieves Definition 2 in the following theorem, the proof is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 2:
The proposed encrypted keyword search scheme achieves query unforgeability in Definition 2 if ABS is an unforgeable signature scheme.
Revocability. Our protocol achieves Definition 3 in the following theorem, the proof is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 3:
Our protocol achieves revocability in Definition 3 if HMAC is a preimage resistant MAC scheme.
Discussion and Performance Analysis
We first give a discussion of our schemes by comparing with several latest existing works. Then, we analyze the performance of our scheme in terms of the computation overhead and search efficiency.
Discussion
Several existing works close to ours have been proposed recently. Works of [9] , [12] , [22] are related to the access control of cryptographic cloud storage, and [2] , [4] , [6] , [13] , [20] , [21] , [23] are related to the multi-user encrypted keyword search schemes.
In Wang et al. [22] , an owner's data is encrypted blockby-block using the symmetric key cryptography. A binarykey tree is constructed over the block keys to reduce the number of keys given to each user, and all binary-key trees for all files must be managed by files' owners. If owners want to share their file with other users, they must distribute the binary-key tree to all users individually. Users' read and write rights are not separable: valid users can only read (or called decrypt) files but cannot update the original files. Ion et al. [9] and Li et al. [12] adopted the ABE (CP-ABE or KP-ABE) for data encryption to achieve the fine-grained access control. Since their works and our work all try to realize fine-grained cryptographic cloud storage by the help of attribute based cryptosystems, we compare the computation complexity of these three works, and the results are summarized in Table 3 . Ion et al. [9] describes a secure publish/subscribe framework in which publishers (owners) can share encrypted information with subscribers (readers) with the help of untrusted brokers (storage servers), a 1-writemany-read scheme. The work of Li et al. [12] also describes a fine-grained data access control protocol for sharing personal health records in the cloud storage. Multi-authority KP-ABE of Chase et al. [5] is used for providing data confidentiality and fine-grained data access control. Compared with our scheme, Li et al. [12] considered a different set of requirements of the write accesses to the cloud: a timelimited write permission. To update a file, the user must first contact the owner (who must be online to reply) for a onetime individual authorization. The owner generates a signature with a specific valid period, and then encrypts the timelimited signature and the time information by a public-key encryption algorithm (Details of signature and public-key encryption algorithms are not specified, and we use C sign and C enc to denote their computation cost for a comparison in Table 3 ). Their update access control frequently requires [20] no no no no no -no C. Wang et al. [21] yes no no yes yes -no Our Scheme yes yes yes yes yes yes yes the owner's help. Moreover, different from our scheme, [12] discussed a different revocation, attribute revocation, which revokes the read access privilege. Consequently, neither of these schemes achieves the OI-MWMR for multi-user cryptographic cloud storage. Works of [2] , [4] , [6] , [13] , [20] , [21] , [23] considered the multi-user encrypted keyword search scenario. Bao et al. [2] , [23] is one of the design bases of our scheme. Their scheme allows each user to possess a distinct secret key for generating the trapdoor respectively. The key advancement of our scheme over theirs is that our scheme realize the finegrained access control aware search approach and the multiuser updatable secure index. Boneh et al. [4] presented a scheme for searching on encrypted data using a public key system that allows mail gateways to handle email based on whether certain keywords exist in the encrypted message. In their work, asymmetric keys allow multiple users to encrypt data using the public key, but only the user who has the private key can search and decrypt the data. Sharing the unique private key with multi-users is one solution, however, in this case, the user revocation becomes prohibitively expensive because all queries are generated from the same key, and to revoke the key means not only to re-generate all the indexes but also to re-distribute a new key to all non-revoked users. Tomida et al. [20] proposed a searchable encryption scheme based on the identity based encryption. This scheme requires the owner generates a number of indexes for each search respectively, and each index is only restricted to a specific user's ID. In other words, before searching a keyword, a searcher needs to request the data owner to generate an individual index set on the cloud for his personal use only. Obviously, the management cost of personal indexes increase linearly with the number of searchers. Because their scheme searches a trapdoor through a predetermined index set which is manually assigned by the owner but not automatically determined by the searcher's read access right, it does not satisfy the requirement of access right aware search. Also, revocation is not considered in their scheme. Finally, [4] , [20] are highly dependent on the existence of data owner, and users cannot execute the keyword search without the help of the owner (e.g. when he is offline).
Curtmola et al. [6] partly solved the multi-user problem using broadcast encryption. The set of authorized users share a secret key r (which is used in conjunction with a trapdoor function). Only people who know r will be able to access/query the data. A user can be revoked by changing r, and using broadcast encryption [15] , [16] to send the new key r to the set of authorized users. The revoked users do not know r , and hence cannot search. Li et al. [13] proposed authorized private keyword search (APKS) over encrypted data for multi-user cloud storage using the Hierarchical Predicate Encryption (HPE). In their construction of privacy aware search, capabilities (trapdoors) were distributed by a Trusted Authority (TA) or a Local TA (LTA). So, the trapdoor distribution is obviously a cumbersome task. C. Wang et al. [21] gave a keyword search encryption and some properties of their scheme appear similar to ours. They integrate the symmetric key predicate encryption into KP-ABE, which provides the keyword search with the property of fine-grained access control. Their scheme allows an owner to share his data with authorized readers, and these readers are also allowed to search the cloud according to their access right. The shared data (including its indexes) is not allowed to be updated by other users, and revocation is not supported. Since indexes are integrated into the ciphertext data, it is difficult to update the data or indexes separately. If the owner wants to add/remove an index, the only way is to reconstruct the whole ciphertext data. Consequently, works of keyword search schemes [4] , [6] , [13] , [20] , [21] do not support the (multi-user) update of indexes. Table 1 gives a comparison between these existing schemes and our scheme. The comparison is functionalityclassified in two folds: access control and encrypted keyword search. Access control includes three security characteristics, Fine-grained, Many-Write-Many-Read, Ownerindependent file update. Encrypted keyword search includes TA/Owner independent trapdoor generation, Access right aware search, Revocability without re-encryption and reindex, Multi-user updatable secure index.
Performance Analysis
We first analyze the computational cost of the file body processing on the client side in Sect. 7.2.1. Then, we give a contrastive performance simulation to show the effective- The attribute set in the access structure (tree) l, t
The matrix {l × t} of the monotone span program which is converted from its corres -ponding access structure ness and efficiency of our fine-grained access control aware approach in Sect. 7.
Performance Analysis of Access Control Mechanism
As described in our proposal, the following steps, which process the body of a file for access control, are fully processed on the user's client side:
For analyzing the computation complexities of each process which includes several cryptographic operations such as CP-APE and ABS, we use the following notations in Table 2 . The computation overhead generated from processes (i) and (iii), CreateFile()/Update(), are actually the same, which include two operations, one operation of CP-ABE Encryption and one operation of ABS-Sign. In terms of the computation details of CP-ABE and ABS that are described in Sect. 4, the user's computation costs of the CP-ABE Encryption and the ABS-Sign utilized in our proposed scheme both grow linearly with the size of access structure's matrix {l × t}. These costs are mainly generated from the exponentiation operations in G 0 and G 1 .
The computation overhead generated from the process (ii), Read(), also includes two operations, CP-ABE Decryption and ABS-Verification. In terms of the computation details in Sect. 4, the user's computation cost of the CP-ABE Decryption grows linearly with the number of his attributes which satisfy the access structure. More precisely, the cost is mainly generated from the exponentiation operations in G 1 and paring computations. The user's computation cost of the ABS-Verification is also generated from the paring computations and exponentiation operations in G 0 . This cost also grows linearly with the size of access structure's matrix {l × t}. The computation complexities of cryptographic operations which are included in the three main steps executed on the user's side are summarized in Table 3 .
We make performance estimations for each process step: CreateFile(), Read(), Update() to show the feasibility of the proposed access control scheme. Basically, processing time of CP-ABE and ABS is dependent on the computations of paring and exponentiation, so we make the estimations based on the processing time of paring and exponentiation. The criterion of our estimation is based on the result of Guillevic [10] , which implements the pairing over a prime-order elliptic curves on a computer with 2.6 GHz Celeron 64 bits CPU, 1 GB RAM and Ubuntu 10.04.4 LTS OS. On their implementation, one pairing takes 5.05ms, and one exponentiation takes 5.16ms. Assume N is the number of attributes in the access structure. From details of cryptographic operations described in Sect. 4, the CP-ABE Encryption is mainly composed of (2N+2) exponentiations; the CP-ABE Decryption is composed of (2N+1) parings and N exponentiations. In the other side, the processing of ABS is a little complicated than the CP-ABE. The ABS-Sign is composed of (5N+3) exponentiations; the ABS-Verification process, in the maximum case, is composed of (N+2) parings and (2N+1) exponentiations. As an example of N = 10, let t create , t read and t update denote the processing time of CreateFile(), Read(), Update(). According to the criterion from [10] , the processing time will approximately be: t create = 387ms, t read = 327ms, t update = 387ms. Compared with files download and upload time, we think the performance of the proposed scheme is reasonable for cryptographic cloud storage.
Performance Analysis of Access Control Aware
Keyword Search Scheme
We first give a binary tree based file management approach for the proposed access structure computation which greatly reduces the cloud server's computation overhead. Then, we give a theoretical simulation to show the effectiveness and efficiency of our scheme. The result of the access structure computation T sel f −sign | = T decrypt shows whether the encrypted file with an access structure T decrypt can be decrypted by a user with attributes described in her T sel f −sign . Assume the number of encrypted files on the cloud server is n, then in a naive implementation, the cloud server must execute T sel f −sign | = T decrypt n times for each query. We can see such a naive method takes too much computation overhead for the cloud server. Here, we propose a binary tree based file management method for the access structure computation which greatly reduces the server's computation overhead. As a toy example shown in Fig. 3, let {A , B, C, D} be an entire attributes set, then the pointer to a file with T decrypt = {(A ∧ B) ∨ (C ∧ D)} can be located under the leaf nodes of {1100} and {0011} of the binary tree. We assume such a file locating process is done by the server when each encrypted file is uploaded to the cloud. Then, if a query constructed by a user with T sel f −sign = {(A ∧ B)} (which is expressed as {1100}) is sent to the server, with the binary tree based method (Fig. 3) , the cloud server can easily identify the corresponding pointers to all decryptabled files (or says, identify the search cope) under the nodes of {0000}, {0100}, {1000}, {1100}. Under such a binary tree based file management, for a user whose number of attributes is k, the cloud server can identify his decryptabled files by collecting file pointers under 2 k leaf nodes. We say the computation overhead of such execution is much smaller compared with a naive method.
Next, we theoretically simulated the performance of the proposed scheme. To show the key feature of our 
Ion et al. [9] Not supported (Update())
Li et al. [12] O( scheme, we adopt a contrastive simulation between an existing multi-user search scheme and ours:
(i) An existing search protocol proposed by Bao et al. [2] , [23] , which is an encrypted keyword search scheme without considering access right. (ii) Our scheme. Cloud server performs the keyword search while being aware of the user's access right.
Our theoretical performance simulation is based on the following settings. The number of encrypted files on the cloud server: N f ile = 500 (Fig. 4) and N f ile = 1000 (Fig. 5) , the average number of keywords for each encrypted file: N keyword = 10, the number of attributes in the access structure T sel f −sign for generating the ABS: N attribute = 10, let N decrypt be the decryptable files number of the user who generates the query. Recalling the Search() phase in Sect. 5.2, we note that to execute the S earch() without considering the ABS based scope narrowing, the cloud server computes one paring and one HMAC for each index attached to the encrypted file. We measured the time of HMAC using the OpenSSL toolkit 1.0.1 under a VMware environment with the similar benchmark setting of Sect. 7.2.1, and it costs t hmac = 0.0041ms † . Then, we implemented the access structure computation, T sel f −sign | = T decrypt , using C language. The maximum attribute number of an access structure is set as N attribute = 10. To obtain the average computation time t binary , we measured the time of T sel f −sign | = T decrypt † HMAC algorithm takes a 16[bytes] random number as its input, and we choose a secret key of 256 [bits] . Finally, we conclude the time for both cases (i) and (ii) as we described above.
We simulate both cases by taking a sample of N decrypt from the following two sets: {25, 50, 75, 150, 250} and {50, 100, 150, 300, 500}. It means that the number of decryptable files is assumed to vary separately from 25 to 250 for N f ile = 500, and from 50 to 500 for N f ile = 1000. Figures 4, 5 contrastively show the simulation results for both cases: the execution time T search−partial of case (ii) for searching a keyword through the user's decryptable file group is obviously improved than the execution time T search−all of case (i) for searching through all files on the cloud server. Our scheme is shown quite efficient because it narrows the search scope and minimize those extra computation (e.g. paring and HMAC in the S earch() phase) from unreadable files.
Remark. From the simulation results we can see that the performance of the Search() execution is roughly proportional to the performance of the paring computation. For cloud servers equipped with high-performance CPUs and the parallel processing architecture, the runtime for paring computations can be improved, and moreover, multiple paring computations can be parallelly-processed in less time.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we interdependently harmonized the access control approach to the encrypted keyword search, and proposed the fine-grained access control aware keyword search. The security of the proposed scheme is proved based on several newly extended or defined security requirements. Contributions of our work is clearly shown by a comparison study with several latest existing works. Finally, an efficient implementation method of the proposed scheme is given for reducing computation overhead. As the contrastive performance simulation results, owing to narrowing the server's search scope to the user's decryptable subset, our scheme decreases information leakage from the keyword search progress, and is shown to be efficient.
Among the discussion of Sect. 5.1.2 and Sect. 3 (Definition 3), we argued that the following problem, where a revoked user can still read (decrypt) his previously decryptable ciphertexts with old keys because his attributes are not revoked, is one of our next research directions. We would like to discuss the solution and try to give an extended scheme that protects the proposed cloud system from such a scenario. Exploiting the attribute-based encryption of Sahai et al. [18] (which provides attribute revocation) together with our scheme would be the most promising and could be considered in future work. Our scheme is also based on the Attribute-Based Signature (ABS) [14] of Maji et al. We describe the detailed algorithms of ABS in this section. There are two entities exist in ABS: a central trusted authority (TA) and users. The authority is in charge of the users' cryptographic keys. Denote the universe of attributes as U, As the access structure in the CP-ABE, there is a monotone boolean claim-predicate (access structure) T sign over U whose inputs are associated with attributes of U. We say that an attribute set U satisfies a predicate T sign if T sign (U) =1. The algorithms are described as follows. Setup The authority obtains a key pair (PK, MK) and outputs public parameters PK and keeps a private master key MK.
Choose suitable cyclic groups G and H of prime order p, equipped with a bilinear pairing e : G × H → G T . Choose a hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z * p . We treat A = Z * p as the universe of attributes, where p is the size of the cyclic group. t max means the claim-predicate whose monotone span program has width at most t max . Choose random generators: The master key is MK = (a 0 , a, b) . The public key PK is a description of the groups G, H and their pairing function, as well as:
(H, g, h 0 , . . . , h t max , A 0 , . . . , A t max , B 0 , . . . , B t max , C) Key-Generation(MK, U) To assign a set of attributes U to a user, the authority computes a signing key S K U and gives it to the user.
On input MK as above and attribute set U ⊆ A, Choose random generator K base ∈ G. Then Set: K 0 = K Here, the signer may not have K u(i) for every attribute u(i) mentioned in the claim-predicate. But when this is the case v i = 0, and so the value is not needed. The signature is σ = (Y, W, S 1 , . . . , S l , P 1 , . . . , P l ) Verify(PK, m, T sign , σ) To verify a signature σ on a message m with a claim-predicate T sign , a user runs Verify(PK, m, T sign , σ), which outputs a boolean value, accept or reject. distinct users, but some of them may query the same key
